THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Is our Age post-Christian?

Hermann Rauschning, ex-President of the Danzig Senate, who, when from close personal acquaintance with Hitler he had discovered the inner significance of Nazism, forsook the Reich and fled to England, has recently written a book called *The Beast from the Abyss* dealing in the most arresting fashion with the more profound problems of the existing situation as it bears on the future of civilization. In his volume Rauschning propounds the following interrogation :

> 'One question dominates all others—how can any faith be possible these days? This country too (*i.e.* England) and the Anglo-Saxon world is living only on a last sublimation of the long-evaporating Christian faith. Here lies the deepest source of doubt of the possibility of a regeneration of the Western world. Is it still possible to be Christian? . . . Are we not in a post-Christian era?'

A German professor, Eucken, in the era before the Great War wrote an essay with the alarming title *Can we still be Christian?* and came to the conclusion that it was still possible. His arguments are to-day worth re-reading. In this question so much depends upon the meaning we give to the term Christian. When Rauschning asks,

> 'Is it still possible to be Christian? . . . Are we not in a post-Christian era?'

he seems to us to be taking the term Christian in a traditional sense, by which we mean he is thinking of the Christian religion

mainly in terms of some past epoch. If we do that, then the position of Christianity to-day must seem most precarious, because not a little of the traditional Christian dogma is dead. Not a few of the inherited Christian institutions are ineffective. Even some of the great Christian Churches appear to be nigh unto vanishing, but these things are not the Christian religion in its essence. They are simply various historic aspects of it. Auguste Sabatier, in his fine book *Religions of the Letter and the Religion of the Spirit*, brings out clearly the dynamic as contrasted with the various static aspects of the Christian religion, and for Sabatier the dynamic or spiritual function of that religion is its essential characteristic.

In the April issue of the *Hibbert Journal*, Canon England, in a scholarly article 'The Christ and the Holy Spirit,' shews that the term Christ serves two uses in the New Testament: (1) to denote the historic Jesus; (2) to denote the Eternal Spirit manifested in and through Jesus and His Gospel. There seems to us to be no evidence to-day that this Spirit is less manifest in world affairs and less influential in human policy than in any past Christian century. Indeed, to us it appears to be the reverse. That interesting personality, Joachim of Floris, a Calabrian abbot of the twelfth century whom Dante hailed as endowed with the prophetic spirit, taught the view that there were three great eras in the religious history of mankind: the first, the reign of the transcendent celestial Creator and Father; the second, the reign of the Incarnate Son, Jesus Christ; the third, the reign of the eternal Spirit. This third reign, he taught, was just about to begin. The Church at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215 A.D.) condemned Joachim's views, but, as indicating their reverence for him, would not condemn their author. Perhaps where Joachim was wrong was that he viewed these three divine reigns as consecutive. The Son does not replace the Father, nor the Spirit the Father and the Son. What Joachim really stood for was the development of the Christian religion, its transition through successive stages, the last and final stage being the reign in human history of the Divine Spirit. It seems to us that the Christian world, if it be not seduced by slavish fears and materialistic dreams, is nearer to realizing to-day this universal and eternal conception of the Christian religion than

it has ever been in the past. Never, at any rate, has Great Britain and the British Empire been more ready to offer the supreme sacrifice in the cause of right and truth, freedom and justice, humanity and peace, and it is these values, as William Blake truly saw, which constitute the very essence of the Christian Gospel.

> 'To Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love
> All pray in their distress;
> And to these virtues of delight
> Return their thankfulness.
>
> For Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love
> Is God, our Father dear;
> And Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love
> Is man, His child and care.
>
> And all must love the human form
> In heathen Turk and Jew;
> Where Mercy, Love and Pity dwell
> There God is dwelling too.'

The poets get closer to the heart of the Christian religion than do the dogmatists.

When Rauschning writes, 'Are we not in a post-Christian era?' the correct answer would appear to be, 'No; we are in a pre-Christian era, but one which possesses the promise and potency of the reign of the Spirit of Christ.'

A Free Faith in a Free Church.

The most fundamental of Church problems to-day are not financial, although it is not unnatural that poverty-stricken clergymen and parishes should think that they are. Our profoundest problems are concerned with Christian freedom. Our differences here render us disunited and ineffective. The range and intricacies of the subject are enormous. Lord Acton, whose main interest it was, read some thousands of volumes bearing on the theme, but in the end failed to produce his *magnum opus*.

Freedom is presented in the New Testament as one of the great notes of the Christian religion. Jesus Christ was supremely the Liberator in the sphere of religion and ethics. 'With freedom did Christ set us free'; 'Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty,' wrote St. Paul. 'If the Son shall set you free, ye shall be free indeed,' wrote St. John. Yet, in the course of its history, no human institution during the last two thousand

years can shew more terrible examples of tyranny and slavery than the Christian Church. The totalitarianism of the Nazi pales beside the totalitarianism of the Inquisition. The Church's tyrannical policies were mainly inspired by zeal for God and the ideal of loyalty to Christian faith, morals and order.

But was not religious fanaticism, with all the obscurantism, intolerance and ferocity which accompany it, the real root of this tyranny? This suggestion misses the mark. The cause of the hostility to Christian freedom within the Christian Church is the existence of the Church itself. Bishop Creighton, with keen insight, noted the tension between the two main factors in the situation. He wrote: 'There is the claim of the individual to be free and there is the need of the institution to be something.' But are both on an equality, or has the institution the superior claim? Or is it possible that the individual has the superior claim? This is the very essence of the conflict to-day in the political world between Totalitarianism and Democracy. But here the State is the institution, not the Church.

We English people, as a whole, are quite convinced in the political conflict that the individual has rights which are more authoritative than those of the State. Are we going to assert that in the case of the Church and the individual the right answer is the reverse? The Church of Rome has no doubt that this is so. And in a lesser degree a number of other Christian Churches take the same view, and probably only differ from the Church of Rome in that they apply the principle with less administrative consistency and unflinching logic.

Yet what little justification is there for such a policy in the teaching of Jesus Christ? That teaching is primarily and essentially concerned with the relation of the individual to the divine Father on the one hand, and the relation of the individual to his fellow human beings on the other hand. The Church is never mentioned in our earliest Gospel sources (*Q*, *Mk.*). It occurs only in two passages in *Matthew*, one of which was certainly not spoken by Jesus and the other probably not. If we accept Jesus Christ as our guide, plainly the Church comes second, not first, in the Christian religion. The Church exists for man, not man for the Church. The Church's organization, ministries, sacraments, formularies are all subject to modification and re-creation

if the welfare of the individuals which compose the Church demands such changes. But, it will be objected, surely there is the need of the Church to be something. Certainly, and that need is that the Church should be first and last the organ of the Spirit of Jesus Christ — the spirit essentially of love, truth and freedom. It is the failure by our Church leaders to recognize clearly and to act courageously on this principle which is holding up Christian unity and all those united endeavours which would increase enormously the effectiveness of the Christian religion in the modern world. We are convinced that until the Church of England authorities face this problem with unflinching courage in their own case, and make the true conception of Christian freedom the basis of their Church policy, the English Church will fail, not only in solving many of the most serious problems with which it is faced to-day — and which, as we see, threatens its very existence — but also we shall all fail to secure that religious and moral leadership which we believe to be essential for human welfare, human progress and human unity in a world distraught by tyrannies, obscurantism and conflicts.

This conviction would appear to be also that of the Dean of St. Paul's, who recently, addressing the Anglo-Czechoslovak Christian Fellowship, said : [1]

> 'The freedom of men is closely bound up with the influence of the fundamental Christian ideas. One of the safeguards of peace and probably the most effective would be the existence of a united Christian Church, united in freedom, allowing many differences of expression and worship, but one in the service of God and man.'

Sabbatarian Legislation.

The recent Parliamentary debate on the opening of places of amusement on Sunday—a proposal rejected by a narrow majority — raises issues of considerable importance for our national welfare. There are two clear issues involved. (1) Whether the opening of places of amusement on Sunday is desirable in the interests of our national life; and (2) whether legislation should be invoked to enforce Sunday observance in this matter. Whether the opening of places of amusement on Sundays will contribute to the national welfare, must depend upon whether it is in the national interest that one day in seven should be kept in an

[1] *The Spiritual Issues of the War.* No. 75. April 10, 1941.

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entirely different way from the other six. There is very general agreement that this is a practice entirely advantageous, especially if the observance of the seventh day makes it a day of rest. There is little doubt that such regular intervals of rest make for more effective work on the other six days. When in the Great War, Archbishop Davidson, speaking from the point of view of the Christian, declared that work on the land on Sunday was permissible in the national interest, a farmer churchwarden remarked to his rector that the Archbishop did not know much about horses. 'You can't work them seven days in the week without loss, and I expect the same is true of men.'

But quite apart from the economic argument—which is no doubt weakened by the fact that working people of every class, from school teachers to bricklayers, with the exception of domestic women and agricultural labourers, possess two Sabbaths in every week—there are various cultural considerations which support the value of Sunday observance. Sunday has provided opportunities of social intercourse, particularly within circles of relations and friends and sick neighbours, which make for social solidarity. Again, without Sunday observance the Christian religion would have had very little opportunity of exerting its influence upon our national life—indeed, it is more than doubtful whether the Christian religion would have survived at all. If Judaism owes much to its Saturday and Islam to its Friday, Christianity owes no less to its Sunday. If it be not insular to regard England as a more Christian country than France, may it not be that this religious difference between the two countries is due to the fact that the continental Sunday is a day almost entirely devoted to amusement?

If, therefore, we really believe that the strengthening of Christian influences will be for the welfare of our nation, we certainly ought to try to preserve the religious observance of Sunday. All the State can do in this matter is to protect Sunday as far as possible from secular intrusion, so that it may be free to be used for religious purposes if people can be induced by argument, persuasion, example so to use it. In no British community can legislation go further. It is frequently said that you cannot make people moral by Act of Parliament. This is a facile half-truth and refers particularly to the penal function of legislation. But there are two other functions of legislation, the

protective and the *educative*. The protective and educative functions of legislation can certainly make it easier for people to do right and can afford them guidance as to what is right. This refers particularly to the thoughtless, ignorant and weaker members of our community. Sunday protective legislation defends large numbers of well-meaning people from being exploited by those whose love of money or love of pleasure makes them indifferent to the higher interests of their fellow-citizens. Not then as puritans, but as British citizens who desire the welfare of our community—the greatest good of the greatest number—we welcome the recent decision taken by the House of Commons in this matter.

Money and the Ministry.

This combination, money and the ministry, would sound very strange in the ears of a primitive Christian. 'Silver and gold have I none,' said St. Peter. If a Christian prophet should ask for money, that, according to the *Didache*, or *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, was to be taken as a sure sign that he was a false prophet. Eusebius, the Church historian, relates that the paying of pecuniary stipends to church ministers was not a Catholic custom but originated among heretical sectaries. Our Lord is often cited as saying, 'The labourer is worthy of his hire' (fee) (*Lk.*x.7); but the original form of this *Q* saying as preserved in *Matthew* (x.10) runs, 'The labourer is worthy of his food'—and the context indicates that this is certainly the right form of the saying. The primitive Christian ministers were given food, offerings of first fruits, and so on, by the members of their congregation, but they were not given money. There was one sound reason for this. It was the custom for the ministers of the Christian Church to live on their own resources: in many cases their earnings. Hence they were in no need of regular salaries to be paid them for the discharge of the voluntary duties of their church offices.

When a visitor was standing beside a mediaeval Pope watching the great sums of money being poured into the papal treasury, he remarked to the Pope, 'St. Peter said, "Silver and gold have I none."' 'That is true,' replied the Pope; 'but things have improved much since St. Peter's day.' Whatever the Pope's financial position may be, that of the English clergy

is far from affluent. They feel the pinch of poverty. There is nothing new about this. The great bulk of the clergy have always felt it, especially since the Reformation, when they were not only permitted to marry but even encouraged to do so.

It is not, however, the poverty of the clergy which is vexing the souls of some Church administrators to-day, but the inequality in clerical stipends. It would be well if these two things, 'the poverty of the clergy' and 'the inequality in clerical stipends' were kept distinct, for it is not possible to remedy clerical poverty by the simple device of equalizing the incomes of the clergy out of existing resources. The Church's present income is not large enough for that. It is well, however, to realize the great improvements which during the last hundred years have been made in relief of the poverty of the clergy. During that period, some 9,000 benefices have been increased by at least £100 per annum. This has been due to the judicious efforts of the Ecclesiastical Commisioners, Queen Anne's Bounty and the Queen Victoria Clergy Fund. Unfortunately recent tithe legislation (distinctly harsh and unjust in the case of the clergy) and the fall in the purchasing power of money have reduced the value of much of this wise and charitable administrative work. We doubt if any just-minded Englishman, who studies the history of Church finance during the last hundred years, will not be led to strong appreciation of the Church's administration in this department. This does not mean that there is not more which remains to be done in the sphere of Church financial reform, but it does mean that the Church here has ground, not for shame, but for modest self-congratulation. It also means that it might be wise for the Church in this department to go on as she has been going, and to leave the administration and further reform of her finance in the strong and capable hands in which it now is.

In this sphere of Church financial reform we need to be careful not to be led astray by slogans. Equal pay for equal work: from each according to his ability: to each in accordance with his needs—are noble ideals but their application is beset with difficulties. For instance, how is it to be decided that work is equal? Does a clergyman with a parish of 10,000 inhabitants do more or better work than one with a parish of 1,000? Again, there are parochial endowments to be considered. Is it morally

right to take away a considerable part of the endowment of a small parish to supplement the small endowment of a large parish? Xenophon in his *Cyropaedia* relates that one day two boys, one a big boy with a very small coat and the other a small boy with a very big coat, appealed to the young Cyrus to judge their cause. The big boy claimed that he ought to have the small boy's coat, because it fitted him, in exchange for his own coat which would fit the small boy. The small boy asserted that the big coat was his own and that therefore it ought not to be taken away from him as he had no wish to give it up. The young Cyrus was impressed, however, by the obvious natural justice of the big boy's claim and passed sentence accordingly. His tutor, however, reproved him for his decision. There is a conflict here between justice and utility, and it seems to us that moral philosophers and His Majesty's judges can be better trusted to decide the issue than popular Church assemblies or the interested parties. The legal and financial difficulties which face a redistribution of ecclesiastical incomes are tremendous, and if injudiciously handled may involve the Church in great financial losses and painful and detrimental controversies.

There are two methods which our Church financial reformers will do well to adopt — the voluntary method and the experimental method. If the clergy in any diocese are really convinced of the necessity of such reforms in Church finance as are being advocated in some quarters to-day, they should voluntarily surrender the incomes of their benefices to their diocesan authorities for a specified period in each case, giving the diocesan authority full power to administer the pooled incomes of the benefices in accordance with their reforming principles. The diocesan authority would gain much experience in their discharge of this task of administration. We are convinced that the action must be voluntary, at any rate in the early stages of the reform movement, for only thus can all the legal difficulties and financial expenditure which are entailed by legal and compulsory schemes be avoided. If the reforms effected by this voluntary and experimental method should prove generally successful, they could then, at a later stage, be legally implemented. We have used the term diocesan advisedly, for we are sure that the diocese, not the whole national Church, ought to be the unit in this experimental and voluntary endeavour.

A POLICY IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION*

By R. B. Henderson, M.A., B.D., Reader in Religious Education in the University of Oxford.

PRINCIPAL Braley's book, *A Policy in Religious Education*—constructive and instructive—is one of the most important contributions to the much discussed and still too little understood problem of Religious Education that has appeared for a long time past. It is greatly to be hoped that it will be widely read and studied by clergy, schoolmasters and parents alike, for it deserves all the attention it can possibly get. Anyone who reads it carefully will have a full and accurate picture of the present position of Religious Education in elementary schools, in secondary schools and in the training colleges, and will also know enough of the past to enable him to understand the present. It is really remarkable to find so much information, all expressed clearly and simply, within the compass of a book of less than two hundred pages. There are nine chapters and they deal with: 1, History; 2, Present Position; 3, Church Schools; 4, Agreed Syllabuses; 5, Denominational Principles; 6, Training Colleges; 7, Church and Teacher; 8, Church and Adult Education; and 9, Church and Youth Movements. It is a fairly exhaustive list, and when every chapter contains helpful constructive criticism, when most chapters have valuable suggestions to offer for future policy, and when, on almost every page, there are wise remarks such as a reviewer loves to quote, it will be understood that only with reluctance must attention be drawn to some fundamental weaknesses in the author's position. These weaknesses are to be found also in many of the letters to the newspapers, speeches at conferences, articles and books written on the subject of Religious Education by Church leaders of all denominations. Before joining battle with the author, however, let us examine some of his suggestions: by so doing we shall establish contact with him at

* *A Policy in Religious Education.* By Canon E. F. Braley, M.A., LL.D. (University of London Press, 1941. 5*s*.)

many important points and so, perhaps, be better prepared for the kind of advance to be advocated.

In his Introduction, Canon Braley suggests a policy to include:

1. An expression of willingness to surrender the denominational position in Church schools, not for something meagre and rather hypothetical, but definitely on condition (*a*) that sound instruction in Christian Faith and morals (capitals *sic*), and its *expression in corporate worship* (italics ours), are included as an integral part of the curriculum by every educational institution which receives Government grants; (*b*) that the subject is taught by people who are desirous and able to do so; and that it is inspected by H.M. Inspectors specially appointed for the purpose.

This is a statesmanlike proposal which deserves the most careful and sympathetic consideration of all concerned. We believe that its whole-hearted acceptance would go far to solve many of our present discontents. It is a *possible* solution of them and it ought to be accepted and loyally worked out by the Church and by the State. There is a good chance of its acceptance by the teaching profession, provided that the difficulties presented by the next proposal could be overcome. This second proposal is:

2. The adoption everywhere of syllabuses agreed upon by the Churches, the teachers, and the Local Education Authorities.

This is the *crux*, and discussion of it must be postponed until the other proposals have been mentioned. The third is:

3. In order that there may be a continuous supply of fit and qualified teachers, the provision of opportunities in all training colleges and University training departments for students *who wish to do so* (italics ours) to become as proficient in the content of and the method of teaching religion as they are in other subjects.

This means, as Canon Braley shows clearly in Chapter 6, that Divinity must be included as an optional subject for the Teacher's Certificate. Those who are unacquainted with the courses followed in our training colleges for teachers are strongly recommended to make a careful study of the whole of Chapter 6 of Canon Braley's book. As might be expected from

such an author, the picture given of the training college is extraordinarily vivid and accurate.

At present, no candidate may offer Divinity—or the teaching of Religion—as one of the five necessary and sufficient academic subjects required for a Teacher's Certificate. If therefore, as in Denominational Training Colleges, Divinity is required, it must be an extra. There might be little harm in such a system if the students had ample time for extras: it might then be argued that the more seriously minded among the students would gladly seize the opportunity to learn something about the religion they might be required to teach, and that the others—less seriously minded—might be sacrificed without much loss. This is not necessarily a sound argument; but, in any case, it cannot be applied to the students in Training Colleges. They have just two years in which to study eleven subjects, and every witness has been saying for a long time past that the curriculum is quite wrongfully overburdened. The students have no leisure: they are given no time for reflexion even when they are *not* required to study an extra subject. In such circumstances it does not take much imagination to see what is going to happen to Divinity. It is of course, of necessity, as much neglected as possible—by the more and the less earnest alike. No other result is conceivable, and Canon Braley's case for the optional *substitution* of Religious Knowledge for one of the other subjects is unanswerable. It is unanswerable, that is, under the present conditions: but it may be answered by changing the conditions. Some of us want much more—not less—than Canon Braley asks. We do not want to see Divinity put on the same level as other subjects, and we shall not give way to those who want to make it an examination subject (like others) without a struggle. On the other hand, on no account must Divinity be pushed into a much *lower* place than other subjects, and that is just what happens nowadays. The case for reform is clear enough, and Canon Braley's plan is vastly to be preferred to the existing one. If the choice be between the two, there can be no possible doubt of the answer—but *is* this the only choice? Apart altogether from this question of Divinity in Training Colleges, it is coming to be almost universally agreed that two years is much too short a time for the training of teachers. If the two-year course is to be

retained the curriculum must be cut down: yet it ought rather to be extended. Everything points to a three-year course with Divinity compulsory for all. If it is to be examined, then the examination should be voluntary, but there is no very good reason why it should be the subject of examination. Let us make it different from all other subjects and of greater — not less—importance. There can be no real objection to compulsory attendance. No one need be asked to *accept* any teaching given, but how can anyone say that he, or she, does not believe in our religion until the case for it has been fully heard? Two lectures a week throughout the third year of such a course as we have in view might be sufficient, and if, as a result of such teaching, there is a recrudescence of agnosticism or atheism, we shall at least know how to apportion the blame.

There is reason to hope that such a compulsory course, assuming that proper time was given to it, would be welcomed by the majority of students. But it would have to be given on modern lines. The results of modern criticism would have to be made known to the students, even when they were thoroughly distasteful to the lecturers themselves. There's the rub: the two first qualifications required of a lecturer are (1) loyalty to the Truth, and (2) loyalty to the Church, and they must come in that order and not the other way about.

The fourth and fifth points in Canon Braley's policy need not detain us for long. They are well set out in the last three chapters. They are:

4. Closer co-operation and better mutual understanding between clergy and teachers; and

5. Acceptance by the Church of a much wider view of her educational responsibilities towards (*a*) parents and other adults, and (*b*) youth organizations.

In Chapter 7, 'The Church and the Teacher,' Canon Braley makes another of his valuable suggestions—that young clergymen, after some time spent in parochial work and not before, should spend a term in a Training College, living with the students. In this way students and clergy would gain greatly by mutual contact. It is to be hoped that this seed will fall on good ground and bring forth fruit a hundredfold.

And now for the *crux*. A great deal has been said of recent years about *agreed syllabuses*, and the time has come for some awkward questions to be faced. The claim is made for these syllabuses — it is made in the book under review — that agreement can be reached, has in fact been reached, by the Churches of all denominations (excepting, of course, Romanists and Jews), by all Education Authorities and by the teachers themselves. On page 77 of *A Policy in Religious Education* it is stated :

> 'An "agreed" syllabus means that it has the approval of high authorities, not only in the educational world and the teaching profession, but also in the Anglican and the Free Churches. But agreement does not mean any reduced Christianity. Full recognition is given to such topics as the Church, Sacraments, Creeds and Worship.'

Readers of this paragraph will rub their eyes in amazement. Is this the millenium? Can it really be true that such widespread agreement has been reached on such topics as the Church, Sacraments, Creeds and Worship? If it be so, people may want to know what all the bother is about. It is true that the pages which follow this striking paragraph modify the meaning somewhat, but still the impression left on the mind of the reader is that fundamental agreement has been reached and that such differences as remain are only differences of emphasis. Well, this may be a true picture of our religious leaders — though doubts arise — but it certainly does not represent the views of schoolmasters.

It has been rightly said that the key to the problem of Religious Education is in the hands of the secondary school masters (mistresses are of course included). Let us see what they are doing with it. Some interesting figures are given on pp. 125-6 of Canon Braley's book. At his own college, 139 men were questioned as to the conditions of religious teaching in the secondary schools from which they had come. It was found that 10 per cent. received no religious instruction whatever, and 58 per cent. none in the VIth Form. In more than half the schools, therefore, the Headmaster, who should take his own VIth in Divinity, not only does *not* consider this to be part of his duty, but he does not consider it necessary to get one of his colleagues to undertake it instead. Of course, these figures may not be re-

presentative, and more accurate ones, which could be produced by the Board of Education, might tell a different tale. Probably they are close enough to the truth, and they reveal a state of affairs that demands the urgent attention of all Church leaders, whatever their denomination.

Let us understand the position quite clearly. The inclusion or exclusion of Divinity from the curriculum of the VIth Form depends on the Headmaster, though not entirely on him. Headmasters cannot ignore the strong desires of their staffs. Evidently no pressure has come from this quarter. Governors have power to insist on the teaching of Divinity: they have not used it. Nor can there have been any persistent demand for Divinity teaching on the part of any considerable number of parents. In short, the Headmaster of a secondary school is a constitutional monarch and must govern in accordance with the wishes of his subjects. If, however, the Headmaster himself wishes to teach Divinity to his Sixth Form, he can do so and, subject to the conscience clause, he will meet with little or no opposition. The conclusion that must be drawn, therefore, from Canon Braley's figures is that more than half the Headmasters of secondary schools have no such wish, and that, in this matter, they do not meet with strong opposition from Governors, parents or staff.

This is an appalling truth and the sooner it is faced the better it will be for all of us. What can be the reason for the apparent indifference, or hostility, of secondary school masters to the teaching of the most important subject of all? It is certainly not indifference to the moral welfare of the boys: any such suggestion would be bitterly and rightly resented by every schoolmaster in the country. Nor can it be that the Headmaster thinks that such teaching can safely be left to others — parents and clergy. He knows perfectly well that most of his boys do not come under the influence of any Church. What then is the reason for the omission of Divinity from the Sixth Forms of so many secondary schools? Part of the answer is, without the slightest doubt, that the schoolmaster does not share Canon Braley's opinion that any useful measure of agreement has been reached by religious leaders on such matters as Church, Sacraments, Creeds and Worship. He fears, in short, that whatever he teaches, he is sure to get himself into trouble with some at

least of the Church leaders and those of his parents who follow them. Is this a groundless fear? In very big towns, where there is a choice of schools, it may be possible to ignore opposition: but even then a schoolmaster will need to be very sure of his ground before he can go far in any direction without stirring up a kind of strife that he is, naturally and rightly, anxious to avoid at almost any cost. In country districts, it is doubtful if the school can take one single step without stirring up strife. In these circumstances the wonder is, not that so little is being done, but that anything is done at all. But, Canon Braley will retort, agreed syllabuses have changed all that. They have certainly eased matters considerably, but—and here lies the peril—*they have only shifted the ground of battle*: they have not carried us much nearer to real victory. In fact, in some ways, they have taken us further away. To put the matter quite plainly, the more nearly agreed the Church leaders are on the four matters in dispute—Church, Sacraments, Creeds and Worship—the further they move from the position of most of the schoolmasters. Let us consider the four in turn.

Church. There is as much diversity of opinion as to the nature and function of the Church among schoolmasters as among other people, and we shall have to wait for the Greek Kalends before agreement is reached. This, however, is not a matter of very great import in schools—unless the aim is to make good Churchmen out of the pupils rather than good Christians. It must be recognized that, although few would maintain that the object of education should be to make good Churchmen, there are many who think that it is impossible to be a good Christian *without* being a good Churchman. Such people occupy, quite honestly, a reasonable and tenable position: the point is that only a small proportion of schoolmasters share their views. Perhaps the reason is that the young people, with whom they have to deal, are usually not Church-conscious. For them—possibly because of their lack of experience of this wicked world—Christianity is enough and they have not felt any supreme need for an organization like the Church. It is for this reason that sectarian differences hardly ever interest children. For this reason, also, that particular kind of difficulty does not worry,

and never has worried, the schoolmaster. So far, so good—and it is very good. But, unfortunately, Church leaders are inclined to draw a false conclusion. They think that because sectarian differences never play a prominent part in schools unless such differences are forced on them from without, that therefore if they themselves will only compose their differences and agree on an educational policy, there will be no further opposition from the schools. But this does not follow, as a brief examination of the present attitude of schoolmasters to Sacraments and Creeds will show.

Sacraments. In so far as the leaders of the Churches have reached agreement on this most difficult problem, they are deserving of both gratitude and admiration. There must have been some deep Christian thinking on all sides to produce anything approaching agreement, and, here at any rate, we can express whole-hearted satisfaction with what has been done. But we must avoid self-deception. Something great has been achieved, but we must not exaggerate the extent of the victory. We are told, over and over again, that large classes of Christians are excluded—of necessity excluded—from this concordat. Papists, of course, stand outside it: as long as they maintain their exclusive attitude, nothing on earth or under heaven will bring them in. But there are three groups of Christians who set no store whatever on Sacraments—members of Unitarian Churches, the Society of Friends and the Salvation Army. Dare anyone say that the Holy Spirit is less active among these bodies than among the sacramentalists? Dare anyone say that these bodies can present less evidence of Christian lives? By their fruits ye shall know them. Schoolmasters will apply the test and will refuse to teach their children that the Sacraments are *essential* to Christianity. They may be very valuable—to some people: the evidence is clean against their necessity for all.

Creeds. The real battle will take place here. Schoolmasters are accustomed to approach matters on the intellectual side and they possess minds accustomed to the weighing of evidence. It is continually being assumed that the three Prayer Book Creeds can be used as a foundation of agreement. It may be so among the Churches, but it certainly is not true of the schools. The

Creeds were formulated many hundreds of years ago and they are the expression of the faith of a pre-Copernican age. To ask schoolmasters to take the Prayer Book as the basis of religious teaching nowadays is like asking medical men to make no use of any knowledge of the human body which has been gained since the sixteenth century. No subject has undergone such profound changes as theology, and yet we are asked in this subject, though in no other, to base our teaching on text-books long out of date. This argument may be held to prove too much, for it would rule out the Bible as well as the Creeds. But this is not so: we want the Bible to be taught just as we want the Classics to be taught, because both Bible and Classics are the sources of our civilization—Bible and Classics—not one without the other. One of the big mistakes often made in the presentation of our religion to the young is to pretend that it is Jewish, whereas in truth it is Jewish and Hellenic as well. But we do *not* advocate the blind acceptance of either the one or the other. Both must be interpreted and taught *in the light of modern knowledge*. All things necessary for salvation are to be found in the Bible if it be studied in this light. But this vitally affects the Creeds. Let us take one item: we will choose the Virgin Birth because in a sense it does not matter much one way or the other. The Doctrinal Report makes it clear that there are good theologians who do believe in it, and equally good ones who do not. The same difference is observable among the New Testament writers themselves. The Virgin Birth is plainly stated in St. Matthew, not so plainly in St. Luke, and is entirely ignored by St. Mark, St. Paul and St. John. But, of course, that is not all: if we take the evidence of the New Testament as a whole, in the light of modern knowledge, most (though not all) competent judges would be obliged to cast their votes against the Virgin Birth. If that is not true of our ecclesiastical leaders, it is true of our schoolmasters. *Miracles in the New Testament* has been allowed to go out of print and its author driven into the wilderness, but not before many people have read the book.

Let us, then, face the facts fairly. If schoolmasters are asked to teach the Bible on the lines of the Creeds, large numbers of the best of them will refuse. If, on the other hand, they are asked to teach the Bible in the light of modern knowledge, a

large and increasing number will ask to be allowed to share in the good work.

It will no doubt be said that although the supply of teachers —on the agreed syllabus lines—is inadequate *now*, the defect can be remedied. A sufficient number of them can be trained. Probably that is so, but such a course will only postpone the day of reckoning, and in the meantime the schools will be cursed by the presence of a small number of men specially chosen and specially trained to teach doctrines not held *con amore* by an influential proportion of their colleagues. This will not do much good, and it is a method entirely foreign to the genius of our race.

In this subject, as in all others, the teacher must be entirely free to pass on the truth as he sees it. Once this is admitted—and it ought never to have been questioned—we shall have the right to insist that *all* who intend to take up the high calling of a schoolmaster shall attend a course on the Scriptures. At such a course they will not be asked to believe anything: they will be given the evidence and left to draw their own conclusions. Many of them will find themselves started on a further course of study which will last as long as life and be to them an unending source both of power and of delight. On the other hand, all attempts to put truth into the straight-waistcoat of the Creeds are foredoomed to failure.

Sooner or later, schoolmasters must claim the heritage of all free men. They will not conceal from the young people committed to their charge the plain fact that there is no agreement about Church, Sacraments, Creeds and Worship. They will try to place before them the evidence as they know it, and they will try to train them to form correct judgments for themselves. If an example is needed, we can again consider the Virgin Birth. A conscientious and well-informed teacher will mention all the evidence—not merely the sections at the beginning of *Matthew* and *Luke*—and will then inform his pupils that good and true men have drawn and still do draw opposite conclusions from the evidence. There are good Christians on either side. Where can be the harm of such a method? Is any other possible? And if any other is adopted what faith will the pupils have in their teachers when they discover the truth for themselves, either at school or in later life? Most of the scepticism abroad to-day is

traceable to partial concealment of the truth yesterday; and if we want, to-morrow, to see the dawn of better times, we must dare to tell the whole truth as far as it can be seen.

There is no agreement as to Creeds. Nothing is here for tears, because there *is* a really remarkable agreement on something vastly more important than Creeds.

If the question be asked, *not* do you wish your boys to be able to recite, even with full understanding, creeds *about* Jesus Christ? *but* do you wish your boys to grow up *like* Jesus Christ? the answer given by schoolmasters will be an almost unanimous affirmative. This means very much more than a mere colourless teaching of a Christian ethic which, after all, may be little more than a Stoic ethic. It may include such an ethic — indeed, it certainly will include it — but the Spirit is vastly greater than the code. The Bible will be studied to find out how men ought to live: what they ought to believe will be revealed gradually as the life is lived. It is impossible to start with Churches, Sacraments and Creeds. Before the world is much older, it is quite possible that the Spirit of God will have led us to forms of organization and formularies of faith hitherto undreamed of. Woe betide us if we attempt to interfere with the working of the Spirit. Give the Spirit freedom — and begin with the schools.

Let us then say to the schoolmasters: in the light of modern knowledge, study the Bible and pass it on to your boys. There may be differences of opinion on many points, even on vital fundamentals: when that is so, you will adopt the same method as you do in other subjects and tell your pupils frankly of all such differences. But, above all, you will encourage them to practice what is taught, for only so will they know of the doctrine.

Practice — that is where so many critics of our schools, friendly or otherwise, go wrong. They forget that the most important thing is to lead the good life, and this cannot be done without the daily struggle to lead it. Judged in this way, our schools, though they may be lamentably lacking in proper systematic Divinity teaching, are yet not such complete failures as it might be supposed that they would be. There is only one road to goodness, and that road is one of continual striving. This striving is going on in our schools under the wise direction

of the masters. What they need is more encouragement, better facilities, and complete freedom to speak the truth as they see it.

This is what we are fighting for in the war: sometimes we are much too parochial in our thinking. We love England so much that we forget what a small part of the world it is. Among the great armies of the light now engaged in a death and life struggle with the powers of darkness, how many good communicant members of the Church of England or any other Church are there? We have on our side Jews, Moslems, Hindoos — in fact, all men who value the right and would rather die than submit to the wrong. The Spirit of God is mightily at work among nearly all the peoples of the earth — how can it be confined by the Creeds or the Articles?

Not that right thinking is of no account. Orthodoxy (right opinion) is of enormous importance, but it is so fatally easy to slip from this original true meaning of the word to that other silly extreme represented by 'orthodoxy is my doxy.' Great is truth and it will prevail: but it must have room, and it is for a living space for truth that we plead.

If Canon Braley and those for whom he speaks (may they be many) will but go a little further and trust the schoolmasters — leave them to work out the salvation of the schools — we need have no fear of the result.

It is a great pleasure to be able to end with a further note of whole-hearted agreement. Canon Braley says in his book that there will not be much wrong with a school which meets every day for a service of *Worship*. That is true, and here again let the schools be encouraged by all the means in our power to formulate, each for itself if need be, its own worship. Many schools have already developed a beautiful form of service, the cumulative effect of which on the minds of boys who attend it every day for years must be, and we know is, enormous. It is the greatest and most lasting influence of their school-days, and this is none the less true because, at the time, their consciousness of it may have been dim.

THE QUEST FOR A PRINCIPLE OF PERSONAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION*

By the Rev. Wm. Richardson, M.A., Tutor of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

'PROPERLY understood, history is the record of a struggle, not for the realization of material or ideal values, but for the materialization, embodiment, the registration in consciousness of real values, the values of truth, beauty, and goodness which are thus, so to speak, thrust upon it as the very condition of its life and being. In these terms and in these terms alone can the secular effort of the human spirit be explained and justified, for only thus does it become intelligible.' To-day and during 'the Long Week-end' between the two phases of the great European War, our anxious quest has been for an acceptable philosophy of history which would restore the faith of men in the spiritual significance in the flux of events, and for a principle of personal, social and political integration which would be above class, nation and creed. In such a quest Mr. Cochrane in his book *Christianity and Classical Culture*, from which the above quotation was taken, follows in the steps of Thucydides, Augustine and Gibbon in seeking to discover from a study of great states of the past the source and the causes of their greatness and of their fall.

There could be no better theme for such a study than the glory and the tragedy of Eternal Rome, and Mr. Cochrane reviews her imperial history under three aspects. The period from the foundation of the Augustan Principate to Constantine's Edict of Milan in 313 A.D. is one of Reconstruction. From the Edict of Milan to the Edict of Thessalonica in 380 A.D. is the period of Renovation. The final failure of Theodosius to re-establish the Empire by the policy which dictated this latter Edict marked the end of Classicism and inaugurated the period

* *Christianity and Classical Culture*: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine. By Charles Norris Cochrane. (Oxford University Press. 1940. 30s.)

of Regeneration during which the Empire disintegrated but Romano-Hellenic Culture, through the Church, both conquered the barbarians and ultimately lived on into the Middle Ages.

The *Pax Augusta* was the key-stone of the Augustan Principate. Its aim was the conservation of the best of Classical Culture. The Republic, after conquering almost all the known world, had expired in blood. The central authority had proved unable to control its great war-lords, who had no sense of responsibility to the State. Class-war had destroyed that social and political harmony (*concordia ordinum*) so much craved by Cicero. The spoils of war had undermined public and private morality and religion.

> 'The *Pax Augusta* gave fresh significance to the classical concept of the commonwealth. In the Principate the Romans met the ultimate demand of the political idea and produced the *protector, rector, gubernator,* or *moderator rei publicae* of whom Cicero had dreamed, the agent through whom it was proposed to assert afresh the ideal of justice alike against the powerful forces of monopoly and the excesses of mob-rule. . . . With an extraordinary tenacity of purpose, the Caesars tried to overcome the forces of lawless impulse and passion, the excesses of the acquisitive spirit which had threatened the Roman system with disaster at a moment when its historic mission was still unfulfilled, looking for a corrective to those excesses in the sense of order which was so deeply rooted in the Roman temperament. They thus utilized the raw materials of human nature as they found it in order to realize the classical ideals of stability, prosperity and leisure, the elements of what they conceived to be the "good life." In this sense, Cato in Hades "delivering statutes" was to rank as a posthumous hero of the new régime' (pp. 24-5).

In the last days of the Republic, Law had been regularly corrupted to serve private rapacity, and Power was the final arbiter, its possession the only security. Augustus now had the Power, and

> 'his problem was to associate the notion of power with that of service and thus, at one and the same time, to justify the ascendancy of Rome in the Mediterranean and that of the Caesars at Rome' (p. 3).

Mr. Cochrane in his second chapter examines the ethical, social and political thinking of the late Republic and early Principate with a view to extracting the philosophy of history implicit in such writers as Varro, Lucretius, Cicero and Virgil. In Virgil, the court poet of the Augustan Restoration, we have a developed philosophy of history clothed in the story of the destiny of Rome, rooted and grounded in the distant past and now published for imperial propaganda. *Faber suae quisque*

fortunae. The faith of Rome's original founders is proclaimed according to this maxim in these words addressed to Aeneas by his followers:

> *'nate dea, quo fata trahunt retrahuntque sequamur;*
> *quidquid erit, superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est'* (Aen. V, 709-10)—
>
> ('O Son of a Goddess, whithersoever the fates call or recall let us follow; come what will, all fortune must be borne to be overborne,' or 'every chance may be overcome by endurance')—

and since Jove, the Dispenser of Justice or Doom, is made to say that he has bestowed unlimited empire on them (Aen. I, 278), Rome's destiny for good or ill lies in her own hands by the goodwill of the gods. For Virgil, therefore, Rome had a position, mission and destiny of unique honour among all the nations of the world.

> 'Unique in its ideals, the Roman order was destined to a future also unique; for, as it embodied purposes which transcended the mere accumulation of wealth and power, so also it pointed to an eternity in sharp contrast to the ephemeral character of other systems. From the fate of such systems Rome was saved by the ends which *Romanitas* was to serve. From this standpoint the permanence of *Romanitas* was ensured by the fact that it made possible a realization of what have been called "the essential and indestructible elements of the private personality"' (p. 72).

The third chapter, entitled '*Roma Aeterna: the Apotheosis of Power*,' investigates the assumptions, deeply rooted in Greek and Roman thought, on which Augustus claimed to have laid the foundations of the 'final form of organized society.' Romans believed that 'Rome provided the best model for the reconstruction of Rome,' and Mr. Cochrane is led to the conclusion that Virgil, Horace, and especially Livy held that it was 'both desirable and possible to erect a future upon the basis of an idealized past.' He proceeds to criticize this illusion and traces its origin to the erroneous classical philosophy of 'matter' and 'form.' He says of this archaizing policy:

> 'Such a claim is utterly unrealistic. In the first place, it ignores the truth that history does not repeat itself; that ever-changing situations constitute a perpetual challenge to the ingenuity and endurance of mankind. In the second, it presupposes that men are in fact at liberty to choose between perfectly arbitrary and abstract alternatives of "vice" and "virtue"; in other words, that there is nothing to prevent them, should they so desire, from living the life of their own grandfathers, the "valiant men of old." But this presupposition is

> wholly fallacious; since it implies that human beings stand in no essential relationship to social reality which, in point of fact, they themselves actually constitute. These defects are not accidental. On the contrary, they are the direct and inevitable outcome of a logic which, by ignoring this relationship, grossly misconceives the nature of the "law" operative in human society. The logic in question is, of course, that of classical idealism. The radical error of Classicism is to suppose that the history of mankind can properly be apprehended in terms applicable to the study of "objects" in "nature," *i.e.* in the light of the conventional concepts of form and matter. . . . To envisage [the individual] in this light involves the assumption that he becomes fully "intelligible" in terms of structure and function, or, as Aristotle had put it, of "what he was to be." It thus raises the question of growth or development as this was conceived by idealism. To this question the answer must already be fairly evident. The type, *qua* type, does not and cannot possibly change; it merely renews itself incessantly in and through the individual; while the individual, on his part, achieves fulfilment . . . by virtue of this incessant renewal of himself in the type. . . . This highly formalized and schematized picture of life . . . appears to suggest that the sole essential and intrinsic relation of the individual is with the "type" to which he "naturally" belongs' (pp. 96-7).

This provides us with an important clue to the way in which the Romans, and especially Livy, pictured their own history. The qualities on which Rome's success depended were believed to be 'a unique combination of virtue and fortune.' Livy, we are told, was fully aware of the dangers of obscurantism in this concept of fortune, and Cicero declared that it was only a word to cover our ignorance of events and causes. Nevertheless

> 'with Classicism the concepts of "virtue" and "fortune" are complementary, linked together by what has been called a principle of polarity, and it is wholly impossible to reject the latter without at the same time rejecting the former. . . . Conscious of this difficulty and eager to save virtue, classical humanism resorts to the expedient of treating the two as antithetic. They are thus opposed as "art and industry" on the one hand and, on the other, "circumstance" or the material environment. . . . For [Livy] therefore, the question of Roman greatness resolves itself into a question of "by what arts" the Romans made themselves great. These "arts" he regards as embodied in certain representative characters who thus, so to speak, "typify" various aspects of "political virtue." . . . [So] there is no appreciable distinction between the portraits of Appius Claudius censor and his namesake the decemvir; though the two men are separated by the lapse of centuries . . . while the Gaius Flaminius of the Second Punic War embodies the characteristic features of the revolutionary demagogue in any age . . . the figures depicted are mannequins rather than human beings, because for Livy, as an idealist, the sole determinants of personality are "form" and "matter," and of these the formal is the positive or active principle' (pp. 99-101).

A realization of this ancient way of thinking enables us to

understand not only the archaizing idealism of Augustus and his contemporaries in their quest for a final order of society, but also the deification of the Caesars which was the culmination of Graeco-Roman politics.

> 'Greek thought, starting from the concept of "strictly human excellence," admits the occurrence, however sporadically and unevenly, of individuals who, for some mysterious reason, transcend the common measure of humanity. . . . That is to say, they appear to possess a quite abnormal "potential" of power. This power . . . is rationalized in terms of the familiar "virtue and fortune" (ἀρετὴ καὶ τύχη), complementary concepts which, as we should say, represent the "subjective" and the "objective" factors of success' (pp. 110-11).

The only conclusion possible was that such individuals were of a 'superhuman type,' and so divine.

The next chapter, '*Regnum Caesaris Regnum Diaboli*,' traces the development and deterioration of the Augustan Order up to the climax under Diocletian. Society, under the stress and strain of repeated efforts to 'restore' and maintain that supposedly 'final order,' had been financially reformed, socially and economically organized and regimented, and so thoroughly formalized that not only was it near material exhaustion, but it was also absorbed in the cult of futility. The whole Empire was existing and straining every nerve merely to maintain that 'final' order which itself had been originally established to safeguard the enjoyment of the good life made possible by material peace. Now the very effort to maintain order had rendered any approach to living that good life impossible. Eternal Rome was dedicated to futility.

The period of Renovation begins with Constantine's recognition of Christianity as a legal cult, and with his proclamation of spiritual freedom or toleration, which

> 'represents a genuine departure from anything to be found in the experience of antiquity. The formal segregation from political control of a whole area of human life reduced the *respublica* to relative insignificance. . . . It thus appeared to make possible an accord with the faithful, to whom at the same time it offered a challenge to develop and apply the elements of a specifically Christian social philosophy. In this way, it pointed to an utterly novel idea—the project of a Christian commonwealth. Through this idea, the tendency of centuries was to be reversed, and *Romanitas* was to secure a fresh lease of life under the aegis of the Church. The Edict of Milan may thus be described the great charter of the *New Republic*' (p. 179).

Mr. Cochrane finds two main objects in Constantine's policy: (1) to create a world fit for Christians to live in, and (2) to make the world safe for Christianity.

> 'The former represents the attitude of the emperor to individual believers; it finds expression in an extensive scheme of moral and social reform designed to satisfy their demands and to promote their interests. The latter reflects his views regarding the Church as an institution, and it manifests itself in the project of a Christian establishment conceived more or less along the lines of existing pagan state-cults' (pp. 197-8).

Constantine's attempt 'to legislate the millennium in a generation' did not, of course, achieve *complete* success. He did not even try to cast off, much less succeed in casting off, the evil legacy of the days of Reconstruction, economic over-organization and social formalism. His aim had been to adopt a fresh principle of political integration so as to maintain and refresh the old 'order' of *Romanitas*. It was thus 'renovation.' His attitude to the Church was wholly protective, and he left the thorny problem of the relations of the Imperial and Ecclesiastical authority to be worked out by his successors. He wanted to infuse a little of the new life of Christianity into the old order of *Romanitas*. His successors were to find that the new life was too expansive to be confined to the form of the old order. It was both new matter and new form, a new order.

After the Julianic reaction and Julian's logical attempt to renovate *Romanitas* on purely pagan lines by a liberal infusion of pure Neo-Platonism instead of Christianity—an attempt which failed from its very lack of significance for new life, no matter how consonant with the form of the old order it might be—there was a brief return to neutrality under Valentinian. With his death the pressure of events after the defeat of Valens at Adrianople in 378 A.D. brought about a final change. Theodosius was driven by the urgent needs of imperial defence to marshall every reserve of men and material, and the organization of the empire reached its climax in a legalized fixation of the *status quo* throughout the empire. By the Edict of Thessalonica of 27 February, 380 A.D., and the following imperial legislation, the State became sacred, and tax evasion and social and political 'climbing' became sin. That Edict ran:

> 'We desire that all peoples who fall beneath the sway of our im-

> perial clemency should profess the faith which we believe to have been communicated by the Apostle Peter to the Romans and maintained in its traditional form to the present day. . . . And we require that those who follow this rule of faith should embrace the name of Catholic Christians, adjudging all others madmen and ordering them to be designated heretics . . . condemned as such, in the first instance, to suffer divine punishment, and, therewith, the vengeance of that power which we, by celestial authority, have assumed.'

Of this Mr. Cochrane remarks:

> 'This pronouncement marks the net result of fourth-century efforts to discover a fresh basis for the Roman order. By the manifesto of Constantine and Licinius there had been substituted for the classical idea of the commonwealth the notion of two more or less distinct orders, the one political, the other ecclesiastical. With that of Theodosius, the relationship between these orders was finally determined by the complete subordination of the temporal to the spiritual power . . . if the one served to inaugurate the New Republic, the other heralded the process by which the New Republic was to be transferred into the Orthodox Empire' (p. 328).

Theodosius' final effort at Renovation had officially petrified or 'eternalized' the old order by consecration, but by the same stroke it had unwittingly ensured the final dissipation of that old order. Christian universalism, ethics and philosophy could not be confined to the mould of *Romanitas*. Reconstruction and Renovation had failed. Regeneration alone could now re-integrate the exhausted and mixed Romano-barbarian society which soon followed Theodosius.

The last section of Mr. Cochrane's book therefore deals with the new Christian philosophy hammered out by such men as Athanasius, Ambrose and Augustine from the best of their combined Stoic-Platonic and Christian heritage to be the instrument of that regeneration and re-integration. In this philosophy the classical struggle between human virtue and environment, or τύχη — *fortuna*, is done away, for both man and environment are the products of One Creative Principle, God, who is Love and wills good for man as a consequence. Love is the universal integrating principle ruling throughout, from God in creation and salvation to the soul and the State. Love is the weight of the soul.

> 'The body, by its own weight, strives towards its own place. The pull of weight is not downward only, but to its own place. Fire . . . stone . . . oil . . . are urged by their own weights to seek their own places. When out of order, they are restless; restored to order, they are at rest. My weight is my love; thereby I am borne whithersoever I am borne' (Aug. Conf., XIII, ix, 10; p. 445).

The highest values and objects of that love — beauty, truth and goodness—come from God the Creative Principle into the world and into human experience through the activity of the Holy Spirit, and they are interpreted and revealed through Christ the Christian Logos. The Holy Spirit by our own free reception of it, if we do receive it, 'puts our mind in frame' to love these values. Thus God not only helps those who help themselves, but 'He also helps those who do not help themselves in order that they may help themselves.' This integration of personality through our love of God by our love of the values which He creates in the world

> 'points to a realization of the classical ideal of peace, not through the mortification but through the regeneration of the flesh. And finally, in the achievement of freedom and peace, it discovers the meaning of true felicity, the sovereign good, so far as this may be attained under the conditions of mortality. This it does by revealing a vision of personality which is not truncated at any point and in which self-consciousness has at last ceased to be the blight of life' (p. 455).

The State can now be re-defined in terms, not of common advantage and a common sense of right as by Cicero, but of love. It is

> 'a group of rational beings associated on the basis of a common tie in respect of those things which they love' (*De Civ. Dei,* xix, 24; p. 491).

On this Mr. Cochrane truly remarks, 'From this standpoint the quality of any community may be measured in terms of the objects of its desire.' And so we are led back to the vision of the purpose of history and of human effort in the terms of the quotation with which this article began, and to the vision of a true brotherhood of man founded on the common effort to materialize and make our own those values which are the common inheritance bestowed by a Loving Creator on us, His creatures, for the exercise of our own love in a good-will striving after those same values. So we may come to enjoy the fruition of the Love and Life of God.

IS ENGLISH MODERNISM OUT OF DATE?

By the Rev. D. E. H. Whiteley, M.A.

WE have all met the man who says with a patronizing smile and a superior shrug of the shoulders, 'Modernism? Of course that's out of date.' And he is quite right, too—if he is referring to the Modernism of 1912. The 1912 Rolls-Royce is out of date, but the present-day Rolls-Royce engine is very much up to the moment. The Modernism of 1912, when *Foundations* was published, is to-day in some respects out of date; but the accounts of the death of Modernism, like those of the death of Mark Twain, have been greatly exaggerated. It is indeed inevitable that the way in which an -ism expresses itself in one decade should be out of date in the next. But our critics have a more serious charge to make against Modernism than that it is outmoded.

I am assuming for purposes of this enquiry that two beliefs are of the essence of Modernism. The first is the belief that in the New Testament we can find a fundamentally reliable account of the Mission and Message of Jesus, who was God's unique self-revelation to the world under human limitations. I cannot here and now attempt any refutation of those extreme form critics and historical sceptics who deny the validity of this belief. The English Modernist feels that he is not archaic because in this matter he takes his stand with Vincent Taylor, Easton and Streeter, rather than with Bultmann and Guignebert. The second belief is that

> 'Even in his fall man cannot destroy the image of God within him; he only obscures it.'[1]

From this it follows that there is no chasm between Nature and Grace, or between Reason and Revelation, that

> 'As Plato's pagan Sophia gazes upon herself she learns to recognize herself in the Divine Sophia.'[2]

[1] *The Wisdom of God*, by Fr. S. Bulgakov, p. 121. [2] *ibid.*, p. 14.

I quote these two passages as a reminder that the Orthodox Church has a progressive wing in the persons of Bulgakov and Berdyaev, who are deeply suspected by the more reactionary party.

Those who are classified as 'Barthians' all in varying degrees deny this belief.

There are people who almost seem to take it for granted that Barthianism must be true because it is new and popular. But Nazism is one of the newest political philosophies: it is surely not true merely because it is new. A theory is not true because it is popular: it may be popular because it fits in with the mood of contemporary society. When a violinist is playing, a certain note may boom out because some piece of matter in the room, which has the same periodicity of vibration as the string, vibrates with it. Barthianism may be popular only because it has the same periodicity, as it were, as a large number of people who lost their illusions in the war of 1914-18 and welcomed Barthianism as a movement that expressed clearly what was already being expressed in their own hearts. In a word, the popularity of Barthianism does not prove its truth or falsity. It must be judged, not by the number of its friends, but on its own merits.

Karl Barth was at first a theological liberal. He describes in *The Word of God and the Word of Man* how he became disillusioned with liberalism and took refuge in a traditionalism based on the Bible seen through spectacles the lenses of which were Luther and Calvin. In the same way, J. H. Newman experienced a 'failure of nerve' and took refuge in a religion of authority. But Barth, knowing that he could not destroy the Maginot line of Biblical Criticism by direct assault, went round it. He admits the fallibility of the Bible:

> 'No human word, no word of Paul, is absolute Truth.'[3]

The Bible[4] is like John the Baptist; it points to something greater than itself, namely Revelation. It is not the pearl, but it is the grit that causes the pearl to form. It is not the poem, but it is the experience which inspires the poet to write it.

> 'Why, and in what respect, does the Biblical witness possess authority? In that it claims no authority whatsoever for itself, that its witness amounts to letting the Something else be the authority, itself and by its own agency.'[5]

But here the English Modernist and Karl Barth are in fundamental agreement. No English Modernist thinks that the

[3] Commentary on *Romans,* Pref. to Ed. III, tr. Hoskyns, p. 19.
[4] *The Doctrine of the Word of God,* tr. Thomson, p. 126.
[5] *ibid.*

uses of textual, higher, and historical criticism are sufficient of themselves for the fruitful study of the Scriptures. He must also bring to their study the desire to secure moral and spiritual truth; and to do that he knows that he needs in his own heart the illuminating presence of the Holy Spirit, which will so stimulate his intellectual, moral and spiritual consciousness that he will recognize the reality and significance of the religious experiences which the Scriptures record. The Barthian, in distinguishing between the letter of Scripture and the Divine Revelation which is mediated through that letter, stands precisely where the English Modernist stands who refuses to identify Scripture with the Word of God but has always affirmed that Scripture contains the word of God.

It is clear then that Barth's doctrine of Revelation is shared by English Modernists. The same may be said of Barth's doctrine of the Creeds, for Barth writes:

> 'Results of dogmatic work, like dogmas underlying the creeds which are venerable results, because gained in the common knowledge of the Church at a definite time, may and should guide our own dogmatic work, but never replace it at any point in virtue of their authority.' [6]

In similar vein, Barth's former disciple, Emil Brunner, says of the Creeds:

> 'They are not objects of faith; they are expressions of faith.' [7]

These are the men who are supposed to have superseded Modernism. They have not superseded it: they have confirmed it. The ancient British king Vortigern, when hard pressed by the Picts and Scots, called in Hengist and Horsa from the Continent to aid him. They overthrew the Picts and Scots, but they overthrew Vortigern also. Whether this be legend or history, it provides a warning to our Traditionalists who call in Continental Theology to overthrow English Modernism.

Barth was at one time anti-intellectual, for he wrote

> 'Faith grips reason by the throat and strangles the beast.' [8]

But he has since recanted, for he criticizes Brunner's design of smashing the axiom of reason and declares that

> 'the word of God . . . is a rational and not an irrational event,' [10]

[6] Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 16; *cf.* pp. 96, 126.
[7] *The Word and the World,* Ed. II, S.C.M., 1932, p. 70.
[8] Commentary on *Romans,* p. 144.
[10] *Doctrine of the Word of God,* p. 153.

while in his latest major work he says

> 'It is high time that the anti-intellectualism which has reigned so long in the Church, should disappear finally.' [11]

Barth is well aware of the failings of Religions and the Church. He says:

> 'An odour of death seems as it were to hang about the very summits of religion.' [12]

He balances this by pointing out that

> 'If religion is nebulous and lacking in security, so is everything else which is exalted to oppose religion,' [13]

and that

> 'in religions, the supreme competence of human possibility attains its consummation and final realization.' [14]

So far Barth has merely been echoing Modernism in a different language, but there is one great bone of contention between English Modernism and Barth. He believes that man's salvation is the work of God exclusively.[15] He also says:

> 'I am an avowed opponent of all Natural Theology.' [16]

These views go hand in hand. We all grant that man cannot attain salvation without God's help, but if God is solely responsible for the salvation of one man, He is solely responsible for the damnation of another man. If God is solely responsible for the good deeds of St. Paul, He is solely responsible for the evil deeds of Adolf Hitler! And to say that is to speak blasphemy.

This is the only major disagreement between Barthianism and Modernism, and on this point modernism can await the verdict of the future with no misgivings.

It may be asked, then, why Barthianism and Modernism are held to be antitheses. The reasons are

(1) Barth criticizes with great violence German Liberal Protestantism, which is not the same as English Modernism.

(2) In quarrelling with Liberal Protestantism, Barth, as often happens in quarrels, expressed himself with a bitterness

[11] Gifford Lectures, Hodder & Stoughton, 1938, p. 193.
[12] Commentary on *Romans*, p. 276; *cf. ibid.* pp. 37, 130, 231, 258, 394.
[13] *ibid.*, p. 136. [14] *ibid.*, p. 236. [15] Giffords, p. 91.
[16] *ibid.*, p. 6. I quote from his latest major book because he has had the honesty and humility to declare that he no longer adheres to the opinions expressed in some of his earlier and more violent books.

which he has since regretted, and this has given rise to wrong impressions.

(3) Not a few of Barth's less understanding followers have emphasized mainly what is negative, abusive, and hysterical in Barth's writings. This also has created still further misunderstandings, since Barth has disowned a number of his earlier and more extreme utterances.

Robert Louis Stevenson has described in *Monterey* how, in that place during the 'eighties, I.O.U.'s had taken the place of currency. These I.O.U.'s were universally accepted; but if anyone tried to lay his hands on the dollars which they were supposed to represent, the dollars were not forthcoming. In the same way, theological gossip consists largely in the interchange of ecclesiastical I.O.U.'s such as 'Of course Barth and those people have given Modernism the complete *coup-de-grace*.' It is seldom that such remarks are challenged, and so they become current. But if they are challenged, they are found to be misleading. In conclusion, I believe that Barthianism and Modernism are coming closer together in an alliance against a materialistic and tyrannical atheism.

IN MEMORIAM

EDWARD TILLET SLATER

passed on into the nearer Presence of God on Good Friday.

Educated at Wolverhampton Grammar School and University College, Oxford, he was called to the Bar in the Inner Temple and practised on the Oxford Circuit. He was ordained at Winchester in 1902. He was appointed Rector of Beckbury in 1911, where he worked until 1935. He was Rural Dean of Shifnal 1919-1935, and Prebendary of Hansacre in Lichfield Cathedral 1929-1941. After his retirement he became Hon. Secretary of the Lichfield Diocesan Committee for Sacred Study and Hon. Secretary for Adult Lay Religious Education for the diocese.

He was for many years a member of the Modern Churchmen's Union. For twenty-two years he was Hon. Clerical Secretary of the C.E.M.S. in the Diocese of Lichfield, and he had

been a member of the Central Council in London. He wrote a small book, *Comradeship*, for the C.E.M.S. He was also associated with the work of Toynbee Hall and the East London Settlement.

He was very keen on Conferences, and was especially interested in the A.E.G.M., the Westminster Group, the World Alliance (Commission of the Churches), the National Liberal Club, the Friends of Reunion, and the Oddfellows. He wrote in 1925 *The Group Spirit in Church Life*, to which Dr. W. Temple contributed a Preface.

He always went out of his way to be kind : also he had much humility and a marked sense of humour.

'The first fruit of the Spirit is love, . . . kindness.'

E.G.W.

BOOK REVIEWS

SIGNPOSTS FOR REACTIONARIES*

All the writers of these books are worried by the removal of signposts from our theological world by modernist hands. It is their business therefore to set up again the dear familiar posts of 'the authentic Christian tradition' that the most foolish shall not stagger about and impede the backward march from the modernist precipice. This we are assured is no mere reaction, it is the necessary prelude to progress; the reactionaries are those who vainly hope to bring Christian Theology up to date. The reader of this series, we are frankly told, 'will find himself in regions beyond a Modernism which has already become outmoded; he will also find himself in the congenial and bracing climate of an ancient Faith.' It is with some trepidation that we right about turn and begin our march to the rear; we have an uneasy feeling that we have been here before. Even the skilful camouflage of these young theologians and philosophers

* (1) *The Fate of Modern Culture*, J. V. L. Casserley.
(2) *God the Living and the True*, D. M. MacKinnon.
(3) *Man, his Origin and Destiny*, E. L. Mascell.
(4) *The Resurrection of the Bible*, G. B. Bentley.
(5) *The God-Man*, E. L. Mascell.
(6) *The Re-Creation of Man*, T. M. Barker.
(7) *The Church of God*, D. M. MacKinnon.
(8) *The Necessity of Worship*, P. McLaughlin.
(9) *Catholic Design for Living*, G. B. Bentley.
(10) *Catholic Design for Society*, D. G. Peck.
(11) *Providence and History*, J. L. V. Casserley.
(12) *The Faith in England*, A. Herbert Rees.

Dacre Press, 1940. 1/- each.

of the Church of England cannot altogether hide the damage caused to the ancient buildings by the critical bombardment. Noticing our laggard steps, our guides seek to reassure us by explaining that along this way there is no denial of natural theology; all that is sought is an elucidation of the Christian Gospel as outside it in a world of special revelation in which reason may move within the limits prescribed by Authority.

We are ready to admit that apart from faith reason cannot remain true to itself, but that is not the same thing as admitting 'The Faith' as the *sine qua non* of rationality. All of us deplore the tides of unreason which have swept our world, but the answer to them is not less reason but more, and we shall not turn them back by declaiming from the throne of ecclesiastical traditionalism, or by the more diligent and vigorous use of the authoritarian broom. 'Whom God wills to save, he first drives mad,' says one of these writers. It may be so in some cases, people are cured in mental hospitals; but who would advocate the way of health through disease? Must we all go mad to find salvation? That would indeed be to confuse pathology with physiology, and every medical student knows which study comes first. But we are concerned with theology, not with medical science, with the realm of grace and of 'truths that are beyond the scope of natural reason.' In this realm all we need is to take our courage in both hands and beat a hasty retreat from the chasm of modern irrationality into the awful certainty of the traditionalist 'look and see.' Unfortunately all is not gold that glitters in grace or in nature, and, the use of our reason being forbidden, we are urged to form our judgments only by recalling what somebody once said about what somebody else said about God, Jesus, and Man. We find that following these signposts we have left the open road, and landed in a theological concentration camp complete with barbed wire and sentries; we have full freedom to move about within limits, but on no account must we attempt to get out. We have passed from salvation through madness to salvation through dogma, which is given and must be accepted. If we refuse, we may find ourselves on the slippery slope of 'the Modernist experiment . . . perhaps best characterised as the attempted subordination of dogma to spirituality.' This, however, is unlikely, since the impact of events has, we are told, put an end to the 'Modernist episode'; the 'intrusion of the demons' has seen to that.

Shuddering we read again the Signposts. No. 2 asserts that 'The very word "dualism" is harsh in modern ears, but it is the cardinal article of the Christian faith, that God so loved the world that he *gave*,' 'an act which is the fruit of an initiative that has its origin *ab extra*.' 'The Incarnation entails the entrance into history of a new and supernatural fact. Here is breach with continuity. Of this the Virgin Birth is the sign.' 'The Church is nothing if it is not itself the extension of the unique act

on which we are dependent for our redemption and for the restoration of our inheritance.' 'As the adopted Sons of God . . . caught up into the life of the Trinity itself, we are aware of the mystery of salvation obtaining within the Godhead.' No. 3 asserts that 'whatever else we may have to say about man, this at least must be our starting-point, that man is God's creature'; 'Man has no *natural* power of knowing God, in the sense in which he has a natural power of knowing cabbages and kings'; 'The Christian Church . . . believes that . . . she has the ministry of the Word and the Sacraments'; 'The ultimate end of man is to be found in heaven, after that descent of the New Jerusalem upon earth which will take place at the Day of Judgment; therefore, even if human life on earth to-day involves misery, the human race must none the less go on'; 'The battle which took place in Eden is one of the decisive battles of the world.' No. 4 directs us to exchange the opinions of modern scholars for the alleged unanimous teaching of the Fathers and Doctors of the Catholic Church. 'The Bible has absolute supernatural authority to teach the things necessary to salvation, and it derives this authority from the Word, whose "body" it is, and from the Holy Spirit its Author.' But 'it is primarily in reliance upon the authority of the Church that we submit ourselves to the authority of the Bible . . . only the Church has the right and the ability to tell us which are the authoritative books and to indicate whence their authority is derived.' Should the Church be doubtful, then 'Scripture should be interpreted in accordance with "the analogy of the faith."' That is to say, in conformity with Christian dogma.' No. 5 purports to explain the message which the Church brought into the world about Jesus of Nazareth, 'In the conception of Jesus by His Virgin-Mother there took place, for the one and only time in human history, an actual organic union of the created world with the Person of God the Son.' No. 6 finds an explanation of evil in such passages of Scripture as Gen. vi, 1-4; I Chron. xxi, 1; Job i, 6-12; Lk. x, 18; Jude 6; Rev. xii, 7-9. The great drama of redemption beginning with Lucifer cast out from heaven by Michael reaches its climax in the breaking of man's heritage of sin 'by the sanctification of his Mother, and the spotless Virginal Birth.' The keynote of No. 7 is 'The recognition that the outward institutional framework of Christianity (dogma, episcopate, sacrament) is essential to the recognition of Christianity as the Gospel of the mercy of God.' In No. 8 worship is the will of God declared by revelation, 'the primary and specific function of men,' and we reach the closest approximation to perfect worship 'in that very worship which St. John knew and from which his imagery was derived, the Liturgy of the Catholic Church'; 'the Liturgy . . . is itself the pith of revelation and redemption.' Within this framework Nos. 9 and 10 present designs for living and for society. There still remains the

problem of providence and history, and No. 11 assumes that 'the attempt to retain the view that purpose and meaning can be discovered in history apart from the Christian dogmas and beliefs in which it is rooted is a temporary aberration which is now passing away.' The stream of events flows round three fixed eternal points, *viz.* the Creation, the Incarnation, and the End of the World or Second Coming of the Incarnate One. The author looks backward longingly through his theological spectacles at the 'magnificent and abiding foundations' of the Middle Ages. He says, 'the history of mankind forms part of the creation; man is made in the image of God; God is transcendent and immanent, the Lord of history,' but 'we have sought the master of the created order within the created order and have not found him,' for 'all known history is conditioned by a pre-historic catastrophe, in the light of which alone it is possible to understand historic catastrophes.' No. 12 is not as amusing as '1066 and all that,' but it is similar in its combination of parody and travesty, and is the epilogue of the series. The arrogance of its title finds no place for Quakers or the Free Churches, it is concerned only with the tradition of Catholic truth and life within the Church of England. A full statement of this tradition is given on pp. 34-35; this is the Faith, and in its light 'The Catholic revival was nothing but the reinforcement, doctrinal, liturgical, disciplinary, of the true uninterrupted tradition which the Church of this country shares in common with the rest of the Catholic Church.' The Reformation was a mixture of malice and stupidity from which nothing but evil has flowed, leading to the bog of an irreligious and impotent liberalism.

It is difficult to imagine for whom these books are intended. The ordinary man will not be able to understand either the notions or the language in which they are clothed. They do not speak to his condition, and where they are understood they will be dismissed as untrue or irrelevant. Again and again the authors remind me of the athletic coach's criticism of the man practising the long jump, 'You go so far back for your run that you are all tired out when you come to the place to jump.' Unfortunately these authors are always running and jumping backwards. What the coach would have said to them is easy to imagine. We do know, however, what Jesus said to the men of His day who practised similar antics, 'The men of old said . . . but I tell you,' 'That is repealing the word of God in the interests of the tradition which you keep up.' The appeal to tradition left Jesus entirely unmoved, and we are most truly His followers when we are, to say the least, suspicious of a similar appeal in our day. The modernist has outgrown Calvinism old and new; he can appreciate the defects of Luther, but he has no need to fall backward into this alleged Catholic faith and order to save himself from self-worship. Like a jig-saw puzzle the pieces fit perfectly because they were made to fit, and the result

is a series of logical horrors to describe which I cannot find better words than these of L. P. Jacks, 'Ghosts walk and gibber where tremendous realities once asserted themselves; technique smothers inspiration . . . ending in the supremacy of mechanism and the subordination of God.' We have passed from religion to magic, but our sanity is saved when we notice the hands behind the curtain.

The issue raised by these signposts is, of course, fundamental; it involves truth, dogma, and authority. Of one thing we can be quite sure, there is no possible reconciliation between the modernist attitude and these dogmatic declamations, between process and an isolated particularity. An eddy has neither existence nor meaning apart from the stream of which it is a part. And when we say, for instance, that God was in Christ, we do so because of our essential relatedness and for no other reason. Because of our organismic interpretation of reality we can find no satisfaction either in a bare monism, a sheer pluralism, or a supernaturalism which cuts reality in two. It is not without significance that in theological as in political circles we are to-day witnessing the rise and the menace of the dogmatist. He is a symptom of grave disorder in the modern world, the negation of personality and the duty of each to think for himself. Under the shadow of dictatorship, whether of Church or Party, 'Art becomes photography, and faith is represented by a phrase,' as Westcott said. We may, however, continue to believe that the spirit and mind of man will not for ever be content to remain bound in the prison house of phrases fossilized in dogmatic political and ecclesiastical systems; such a prison is not helpful for the development of the Christian life. Modernism has, as these books clearly show, reached the place and time when it must assert that it is concerned not only with the re-statement of traditional Christian doctrines and their implications, but with the definite rejection of what is meaningless or untrue in them. Unless we are courageous and honest enough to do this, religion will be rejected by the modern mind and find its only representatives in the survivors from primitive and mediaeval times, pathetically hugging their theological relics on the shores from which the tide has ebbed. Certainly the last word has not been spoken in theology even in the traditionalist reiterations of the Signpost Series.

T. WIGLEY.

SCIENCE AND THE SOUL*

An eminent philosopher of the last century declared that 'the soul has outworn its welcome.' Dr. Ellis, Lecturer in Zoology in the University of Liverpool, attempts in his book to answer two questions: What is the idea of the soul? and, Why has it become unwelcome? He answers the

* *The Idea of the Soul in Western Philosophy and Science.* By William Ellis. (George Allen and Unwin. 12/6. 1940.)

first question by tracing the historical development of the idea of the soul from primitive times to the Renaissance, and the second question by an examination of modern scientific ideas.

He begins by giving reasons for rejecting the once paramount 'animistic' theory of Tylor; reasons based on the recent study of primitive language and the light thus shed on primitive mentality. He refers to the work of A. E. Crawley, who has shown that primitive man's talk is 'holophrastic,' *i.e.* describes a whole situation by a single 'holophrase' and does not 'separate out' the elements of that situation by a number of distinct words, as we do. Thus primitive man does not abstract the common element 'soul' from the holophrases 'man-soul,' 'river-soul,' and so on. Anthropologists of the Tylor school attributed animism to savages because they illegitimately imposed upon them their own pattern of thought which included the idea of a non-corporeal, spiritual entity using the body as its instrument, an idea derived from Plato through the Christian tradition, and presented in sophisticated form by Descartes, the father of modern scientific thinking.

Not that Plato and Descartes were at one on this matter of the soul because Descartes was a dualist, whereas Plato was not. According to Plato the world of sense-experience (what we call the material world) was derived from the world of concepts, ideas or 'forms' (what we call the spiritual world) by a process of *limitation*. Thus the material world is not different in kind from the spiritual world, but different, so to speak, in degree. Matter is spirit in a limited form, only half-existing. This unification of our inner and outer experience was undone by Aristotle, who taught that the material world arises, not by any limitation of the spiritual world of 'forms,' but by the union of form with a limiting substance which he called matter. Thus for Plato's single reality existing at various grades of being, Aristotle substituted a double reality, form and matter, and was thus a dualist. This notion of a twin world is less intellectually satisfying than the idea of a single world; monism must always rank above dualism as a system. Unfortunately for the future of European thought, Augustine, though a Platonist, misinterpreted that philosophy, introducing discontinuity between living organisms and the rest of nature, with the result that the material world became an independent world over against the spiritual world and not merely a limitation of it. It has been found by experience that the human mind can never rest satisfied with this division of a single world into two, and the tendency is for the one world to swallow up the other. Dualism is always in a state of insecure stability, like some precarious chemical compounds that are always liable to break down.

But it was Descartes who rendered the dualistic view explicit by inventing the then novel idea of dead matter, a notion all too familiar to us, but which would have seemed strange to Thales (who attributed souls to

amber and the magnet), to Plato, to Aristotle, or to the mediaeval philosophers. It is only because the modern world has grown familiar with this highly metaphysical conception that it takes it for granted.

As might have been expected, Descartes' artificial compound of spirit and matter proved highly volatile. The idea of dead matter seemed so attractively simple that the question was soon asked whether it would not cover all the facts. Descartes had himself admitted that animals were material mechanisms devoid of souls, while man's body was a material mechanism too, though with an immaterial guiding principle. Descartes, basing, as he did, his whole philosophy upon the reality of consciousness (*cogito, ergo sum*), had to find a place for its centre, he could not sacrifice the soul. But the fact remained that its position was extremely anomalous, and though he exhausted his considerable ingenuity in showing how an immaterial entity could act into, if not act upon, a material mechanism, the theory could not survive the physiological researches which disposed of his conception of 'animal spirits,' the pineal gland as 'the seat of the soul,' and so on. As the material mechanism means to the average man something more real than the soul which no one can observe perceptually, it was natural that of the ill-assorted pair it was the mechanism and not the soul that survived. The soul had 'outworn its welcome.'

Valiant attempts were made by vitalists like Driesch to establish experimentally the existence within the organism of some non-material guiding principle or 'entelechy.' But Dr. Ellis shows how the researches of the American biologist Child have short-circuited Driesch's theories by providing an extremely simple and convincing explanation, in terms of differential metabolism rates, of the apparently miraculous facts of embryonic growth upon which Driesch based his theory. Then the work of Loeb on 'tropisms' in insects, and of Pavlov on the 'conditioned reflex' in animals, provided a convincing account of insect and animal behaviour in purely mechanistic terms, dispensing with consciousness altogether. The Behaviourists have rounded off the work by providing an explanation of human behaviour in the same terms, so that the task of interpreting everything in strictly mechanistic terms may now be said to be complete. Descartes' dualism has been abrogated by extinguishing the realm of spirit altogether. That is certainly an achievement.

But it is important to realise exactly *what* has been achieved. To every event in the organism which is perceptually knowable, it is now possible to assign a causal description in terms of antecedent events perceptually known. But the mechanist does not say, or at least is not entitled to say, that events introspectively known may be explained or described in terms of events perceptually known. No conceivable advance in natural science could bridge the gap between the observer's perceptual experience, which if he is a scientist he describes in terms of numerical relations, and my

introspective experience. Even when a 'physico-chemical' (*i.e.* perceptual) description of the activity of a conscious organism has been given, that organism still remains, what it was before, an empirically inaccessible world, 'clos'd by your senses five,' as Blake put it.

Dr. Ellis's survey of European ideas of the soul from the Ionian philosophers of the sixth century B.C. to Pavlov is masterly, but it is his solution of the body-soul dilemma that will strike the reader as most notably original. He maintains that the dilemma is only apparent, and that if we accept both sides of it, it disappears. He points out that just as the seventeenth century (Newtonian) belief in the 'absolute' nature of space and time has had to be abandoned through an acceptance of both sides of a dilemma (that the velocities of all observers, whatever their relative motions, are identical in relation to the velocity of light), so with the seventeenth century (Cartesian) dualism of body and mind. The assumption that inorganic nature is a being devoid of soul, like the corresponding contemporary theory of the 'absoluteness' of space and time, will have to be abandoned. The dilemma raised by biological mechanism is really only a dilemma if it be implicitly assumed that mind is *uniquely* revealed in man (and other animals) and that only these are in any sense psychical beings. This concept of 'inanimate' nature is one of the more unfortunate notions which have come down to us from Cartesian philosophy. In point of fact, the animation of a cat, or of a human being, is a special instance of a wider animation which pervades all nature. The difference between 'non-living' nature and the living organism is in no sense a difference between something animate and something inanimate. The animation of a living thing is indeed co-ordinated in an extraordinarily complex manner; but the peculiar unified complexity of organic activity cannot make the basis of any ontological division of nature into 'physico-chemical' and 'biological' parts. Indeed the existence of organic teleology implies the existence of teleology in the non-living world; in attempting to demonstrate discontinuity between the two realms we should only prove continuity.

Of course we cannot discover by direct inspection whether or not consciousness enters into this or that part of nature. Only if there were some perceptual mark of consciousness would this be possible. Dr. Ellis suggests that such a perceptual or 'external' manifestation of consciousness is the conditioned reflex. 'Perceptually known to an external observer, consciousness is the exhibition of conditioned reflexes.' When we say that an animal displays a conditioned reflex we mean that it 'learns by experience,' the neural 'basis of reaction' is changed by experience; that is to say, there is memory; memory is the inner, conscious, aspect of the outer or perceptual aspect of a changed 'basis of reaction.' Thus a conscious being is one which reacts, or is sensitive, not merely to the immediate present, *but also to events in the past.*

Now sensitiveness is not in any sense a special property of 'living' organisms, but a universal attribute of all material things, which react on one another, so that 'reciprocity' is a better word than 'sensitivity' to describe this quality of mutual interaction. A living system differs from inorganic nature in being a delimited teleological system of reciprocities. A conscious organism differs from one that is merely alive in that its reciprocity is *historically conditioned*. The conscious organism reciprocates, not merely the immediate present but also its past history. The past *endures* in the living organism. It we could imagine an organism with powers of perception similar to our own, but which could only 'remember' its perceptions in little bursts of short duration with a hiatus of complete oblivion between each burst, such a creature would not be one individual, but many successive individuals — as many as there are bursts of memory. From the perceptual or behaviouristic point of view, one would say that its conditioned reflexes were divided into five-minute 'quanta.' Now if these short 'quanta' were progressively reduced so as to approach the limit where the duration of each quantum is zero, our hypothetical creature would still have perception in the sense of reciprocity, but no consciousness or cognition. Matter is thus 'momentary' or 'instantaneous' mind, 'mind which dies away, as it were, in the instant that it springs to life; it is suppressed or frustrated mind.'

Thus we may see how, in the hands of the younger school of biologists the Cartesian dualism is being displaced by a view which sees in mind and matter not two things separated by an impassable gulf, but two aspects of the activity of a Nature that is fundamentally alive. The implications of such a view as this have not yet been worked out, but it is very clear that both the science and the philosophy of the future will be very different from what we have been used to in the past, and the *damnosa hereditas* of Descartes, his cutting of the world into two unconnected halves, will have been done away with. Dr. Ellis is to be congratulated on a very fine piece of work.

J. C. HARDWICK.

CHRISTIAN CRITERIA*

In the middle twenties Paul Tillich pointed out in his great book *The Religious Situation* that every situation in life is a religious situation, and that when we bring religious insights to bear on the life of our age, the more narrowly ecclesiastical and theological world is only one, and that not the most important, sphere which these insights are called upon to illuminate. He analysed every feature of modern Western European society—art,

*(1) *Christianity and the Machine Age.* Eric Gill. (Sheldon Press. 1/6.)
(2) *Dogma and Youth Work.* G. W. O. Addleshaw. (Dacre Press. 3*d*.)
(3) *Christian Discrimination.* George Every, S.S.M. (Sheldon Press. 1/6.)
(4) *The Universities in Transformation.* Adolf Löwe. (Sheldon Press. 1/6.)

literature, science, politics, economics and theology — and showed that fundamentally they expressed what he called the spirit of 'self-sufficient finitude.' That society is collapsing, as he saw, and in each of these areas of life we find change and revolt. Such a state of instability forces Christians to think out afresh the bearing of their faith on every detail of civilized life. They are no longer 'at home' in a stable society which they can take for granted. Rather when the scene in the moral and spiritual world, no less than in the material, is changing so rapidly, they have to realize afresh that the distinctive understanding of life which differentiates Christianity from all other religions, ancient or modern, should give Christians a distinctive approach to every walk of life. As Mr. C. S. Lewis has recently written, 'There is no neutral ground in the universe; every square inch, every split second, is claimed by God or counter-claimed by Satan' (*Theology*, Dec. 1940). We must work towards a new synthesis, on a different basis from that established by Aquinas in the Middle Ages, but no less comprehensive in its range. And the first and most important step is to find adequate criteria to apply to these different realms of human activity (and that of course implies an adequate theology on which to base them). The search for Christian criteria has been greatly helped by the work of the Oxford Conference of 1937 and by the Christian News Letter which has grown out of it. These pamphlets* represent varyingly successful attempts to apply Christian criteria in different fields, and three of them are C.N.L. books. It is true that the most important, Dr. Löwe's, is not written from a specifically Christian standpoint, but it provides a preliminary diagnosis indispensable to the Christian.

The late Eric Gill's is the least successful of the four. Its staccato style is analogous to the firing of a machine-gun. The early part consists of a highly aphoristical statement of the Christian faith (useful for devotional purposes), after which it develops into a diatribe against the machine. Holy poverty was Mr. Gill's ideal: 'What use will be pity, what use compassion, in a world in which no one will be poor, or in misery, or in pain?' (p. 67). It is difficult to take the book seriously; it reminds one of Prof. Tawney's summary of Luther's social thought, 'the occasional utterances of a capricious volcano.'

Mr. Addleshaw's pamphlet is on a related theme: how to help young people to relate their Christian faith to their job and their leisure, as workers and citizens, in an industrial society. He feels that much of the Church's youth work hardly gets beyond the provision of spare-time amusements, and what positive teaching there is emphasizes the more respectable virtues — ordinary decency, honesty, reliability, loyalty — 'which could equally well be inculcated in a youth organization run by a good Mohammedan or Confucian' (p. 15). This leads him to dwell on the Jocist movement (Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne) in the Roman Catholic Church,

founded in Belgium after the last war by Father Cardijn. It should certainly be appraised by Anglicans, and the experiment of adapting it to Anglican ways is being tried in the parish of Parson Cross, Sheffield. Mr. Addleshaw, who is now Vice-Principal of St. Chad's College, Durham, has also written a fuller pamphlet on Jocism (S.P.C.K., 6*d*.). He mars this one by setting up 'liberalism' as an Aunt Sally to be held responsible for everything that he considers amiss with youth work; but with much of what he positively says we think most Anglican liberals would agree.

Bro. George Every is not concerned with machinery and industry, but with Christian criteria in literature and the arts, with Christian 'good taste.' Like Tillich, he sees that there is a certain attitude to the world and belief about God and man 'actually implicit in contemporary literature and art; and we need to evaluate such attitudes' (p. 10). We need a Christian public opinion which could go to the films less indiscriminately, and in a different frame of mind, and could read different novels (p. 61). We have got to recover the conviction that there *are* objective values in these fields and that taste is not a purely subjective matter, as modern education, implicitly dominated by vague scepticism of anything not able to be measured and observed by the methods of natural science, tends to affirm. The Church has 'in her theology a set of principles of her own which could be applied to the analysis of the attitudes and beliefs implicit in modern furniture, modern literature and modern housing' (p. 12). Our appetite is whetted, but alas! instead of showing us *how* these principles can be applied, Bro. Every gives us essays on humane education, on hymns, on public standards and on other things, with far too few positive examples, and we are left in the air. The book raises a further question of some importance. Bro. Every admits that the uncovering of latent beliefs and standards is the work of a trained critic; the spiritual goodness or badness can then be assessed by the Christian. But it is important to remember, as Mr. Lewis has pointed out in his recent discussion with Bro. Every in the pages of *Theology*, that there are also purely literary criteria of good and bad with which the Christian *qua* Christian is not competent to deal. However difficult it may be to separate them in fact, it is important to keep them intellectually distinct.

By far the most important of these books is that of Dr. Adolf Löwe. Seldom have we found so much said in a mere 62 pages, and no one interested in or responsible for education in general, and university education in particular, can afford to neglect it. It has taken someone coming from a different background to focus the issues with which the older and the newer universities are faced in the light of a social and historical analysis without which they cannot be understood. His fundamental assumption (like that of Prof. Clarke in the first of the C.N.L. books, *Education and Social Change*) is that education must be understood in relation to its social

background. He defines education (following the Oxford Conference) as

> 'A social process by which the community attempts to pass on to its members its culture, including the standards by which it would have them to live' (p. 1).

Although this seems plain enough, yet it contradicts the widely held popular idea that education is merely the drawing out of an individual's innate qualities. From this it follows that, apart from the pursuit of truth by research, the university as a social agency has the threefold task of (i) general and cultural education, (ii) vocational and technical education, (iii) moral education.

In the fifty years before the Great War, the English universities achieved 'a unique synthesis between cultural and vocational education, best symbolized in Oxford Greats' (p. 5), which trained the gentleman-amateur as a ruler. But the security, the wealth, the open frontiers which made possible that great age of liberalism have now passed, and with it the spontaneous and harmonious conformity of society which Dr. Löwe analysed so ably in his pamphlet *The Price of Liberty* (Hogarth Press). With their disappearance, cultural education has given way to specialized training, and the universities have retreated from their position as interpreters of the meaning of culture to the purely formal idea of training in 'thinking.' Nevertheless we are in the midst of rapid social change which must be guided and planned, and there is no doubt that the administrators of the new society must needs be the university trained men and women. They will require imagination, enterprise and responsibility and must be able to understand the secondary consequences of actions (this is indispensable for planning) and therefore the social process of which they form a part. How can the universities train these enlightened experts instead of the unenlightened ones which they are producing now? They will require (i) theoretical knowledge of the facts of the structure of our civilization, (ii) practical experience of some aspect of modern life, (iii) intellectual and moral criteria.

So much for Dr. Löwe's analysis, though there is much more than this packed in these stimulating pages; it is difficult to see how its main truth can be disputed. On the constructive side many suggestions are made, including a year's work between school and university, four years as the normal university course, reforms in the lecture and examination systems, adult education for former graduates and a post-graduate school of cultural synthesis. Basically the author is seeking for a new 'humanities' since Greats itself is no longer adequate. He discusses various combinations of general and specialist studies, and weighs the merits of the Tripos system as against that of 'humanistic' specialization (such as some of the Honours courses at the London School of Economics, to the value of which the reviewer can testify). Psychology, sociology, and the study of languages

rather as studies in national civilizations than in philology, play a part in Dr. Löwe's suggestions. On the other hand, he has little to say about Natural Science and nothing about Theology. If what we have said about Christian criteria is true, Theology ought to be the synthesizing subject *par excellence,* interpreting the world to the university and the university to itself, yet as at present taught it could hardly be further from doing so. But there is no space to discuss Dr. Löwes suggestions; they require at least an article in themselves. This is a book whose value is out of all proportion to its size and price. It should be read.

RONALD PRESTON.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

REGINALD WALTER MACAN

SIR,

The two obituary notices of the late Dr. Macan, which appear in the April number of the *Modern Churchman,* will assuredly be welcomed by those who revere the memory of a great and good man. But may I be allowed to call to mind his eminence as a classical scholar by referring in particular to his admirable edition of Herodotus IV—IX? Those five volumes of his will assuredly take rank with Newman's *Politics* of Aristotle; one's only, but lasting, regret is that Dr. Macan never completed his labours by giving us a commentary on Books I—III. Nor should we overlook his contribution (*Herodotus and Thucydides*) to the fifth volume of the Cambridge Ancient History, in 1927. His essay is one of the most attractive things to be found in that encyclopaedic work.

E. H. BLAKENEY.

Winchester.
May 5th, 1941.

THE ADMISSION OF FREE CHURCHMEN TO THE M.C.U.

SIR,

As the subject of the methods and aims of the Modern Churchmen's Union are being treated in your pages, may I suggest that the M.C.U. should become more catholic in its membership? I use the word catholic in no narrow-minded exclusive sense, but with its true comprehensive meaning. The membership of the M.C.U. is at present restricted to Anglicans. Would it not be in accordance with our principles and policy to throw open our membership to all Christian people who desire to support our aims and to implement them? As an old member of the M.C.U. I strongly advocate this reform.

C. N. SWAYNE.

Rye Bank,
Broadhurst,
Ashstead,
Surrey.
April 26th, 1941.

THE FUTURE OF THE M.C.U.

SIR,

With reference to the last paragraph but one on page 499, March *M.C.*, may I suggest one way in which 'fresh and younger blood be brought into the M.C.U.'

Clergy who are now serving with the Forces are finding that they have greater facilities for profitable discussions than are available in ordinary parochial life.

Could not these discussions be organized on Modernist lines? The groups would consist chiefly of the younger generation, both Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals, and would probably include some who are not professing Christians, but who are, nevertheless, earnest seekers after truth.

Not the least to benefit by these discussions might be the clergy, many of whom, in their early ministry, sadly miss the 'mental grindstones' of their peers.

The world crisis and the urgent need of the time for an intelligent and practical Christianity are sufficient grounds for a reasonable hope that serious and constructive contributions would result from these discussions.

That is my suggestion, but whether its application is practical, or even desirable, I cannot say.

ALICE R. CHITTY.

Balmoral Hotel,
Meadfoot,
Torquay.
March 7th, 1941.

COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS AND M.C.U.

SIR,

I shall be grateful if you will kindly allow me to draw the attention of the members of the Union to the fact that if they will make a covenant with the Union to pay an annual subscription for not less than seven years, or until death (whichever is the shorter period), it will be possible for the Union to reclaim the income tax on this amount from the Inland Revenue.

The conditions are, firstly, that the subscriber is paying tax at the standard rate, and, secondly, that he covenants with the Union as aforesaid.

This method costs the subscriber no more, and the obligation ends at death. With income tax at 10/- in the pound it means that the amount of the subscription is doubled, and this is an important consideration when war conditions make the financial position of societies like ours somewhat difficult.

The Council of the Union earnestly commends this method of subscription to the members of the Union, and I shall be pleased to send printed forms of Covenant to those who express their intention of availing themselves of it.

T. J. WOOD,
Organizing Secretary.

249 Grand Buildings,
Trafalgar Square,
London, W.C.2.
May 5th, 1941.